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1. The Association Agreements: a new  challenge for FDI
The main characteristic of the Association Agreements with the EU is the
acknowledgement of the dynamic effects of investments, both domestic and foreign
ones. The transitory period of 12 years is sufficiently long for implementing the
adjustment measures and for preparing the Southern Mediterranean countries to the
competitive environment imposed by the globalisation of markets. The domestic
enterprises, actually protected by high tariffs and customs duties, will have the time to
implement the appropriate adjustment policies and to reap the opportunities of trade
liberalisation (Pace, 1997). Considering the inevitability and the urgency of such
choices, it seems therefore suitable the decision of Morocco and Tunisia to immediately
sign the new Association Agreements. They encouraged the structural adjustment
programmes, reducing the domestic and external imbalances, strengthening the financial
system and introducing new codes for attracting FDI (Brown, Deardoff and Stern,1997;
Chatti, 1999; Hamdouch, 1996).
The benefits of the opening up of the economies – this is the main rationale of
the economic integration – are directly associated to the timely adjustment to the new
economic environment and to the capacity of the local system to adapt its performance
and its structure to the conditions dictated by the international markets. These
adjustments will be possible and self-sustaining when motivations for investment and
entrepreneurial abilities support the reallocation of productive factors (Hoekman and
Konan, 1999).
The dynamic of investments is therefore a crucial element in order to maximise
the benefits of regional integration (Reiffers, 1997). It depends on the ability to build a
convincing development strategy on the existing competitive advantages (in static
sense) or to reallocate the available resources in order to create new competitive
advantages (in dynamic sense). These two strategies are complementary. From this
point of view, FDI – that in some countries, such as Tunisia and Egypt, accounts for
up to 20 percent of the total capital expenditures) may be a crucial factor fostering the
modernisation and the social development.
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2The aim of this paper is to analyse the determinants of FDI in the Mediterranean
region. In particular, we are interested in comparing the recent experience of the
Mediterranean (MED) countries with that of the Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs). Both groups of countries signed Association Agreements with the
EU. Moreover, the recent up-surge of FDI flows into the CEECs raised  some concerns
about the future patterns of FDI in the Mediterranean region. The paper is organised as
follow. Section 2 deals with an important issue for the MED countries: the
progressively marginalisation of the region as recipient of FDI flows and stocks,
marginalisation that could become more and more severe because of the tougher
competition between MED and CEE countries as location of FDI. Although confirmed
by existing data, it is worth to keep in mind that official statistics are based on criteria
and rules of recording of the phenomena that depend on the country of origin and
destination. These conceptual asymmetries  contributed to the alleged marginalisation
of the MED region as recipient of FDI. Section 3 summarises recent trends and data on
FDI in the Mediterranean region, focusing on main home and host countries. Section 4
briefly reviews the existing literature on the determinants of FDI  in the MED region.
Section 5 explores and analyses what factors best explain foreign investments from a
quantitative point of view. The analysis, based on a three-dimensional panel data base,
compares the behaviour of two important sources of FDI, i.e. European Union and
United States of America, not only in the MED region, but also in CEE. Section 6
provides some conclusions.
2. The marginalisation of the Mediterranean region: missing FDI or missing
figures?
According to the last World Investment Report (1999)1, the most authoritative
source of information on FDI, in 1998 the Southern Mediterranean Countries, as a
group, have attracted 6.0 billions USD, i.e. 3.6 per cent of the total FDI inflows in the
developing countries. Notwithstanding the increase of inflows since 1996, the share of
the Mediterranean region continued its decreasing trend during the Nineties (figure 1).
The current experience differs significantly across countries, given their
heterogeneous nature. Egypt, that was the main host country during the Eighties, has
been replaced in the first half of this decade by Turkey and, in the most recent years,
by Israel. Algeria evidenced a stagnation of new foreign investments and its
concentration in the energy sector. Only Morocco, Tunisia and Malta show an
increasing trend during the decade.
This uneven distribution of FDI among countries did not prevent the gradual
marginalisation of the region, that Petri (1997) in one of the few analysis on the geo-
economic aspects of capital movements into the area, ascribes to the limited
attractiveness of these countries, in particular when they are compared with the more
                                                
1 It is published annually by UNCTAD, Division on Transnational Corporation and Investments,
Geneva.
3dynamic and emerging regions in CEE and South East Asia. This negative differential is
a source of worries. Related to GDP, FDI inflows in the Mediterranean region remain
on average below 0.8 per cent, while in the CEEC this ratio exceeds 4 per cent (Petri,
1997).   
Table 1 - FDI in Southern Mediterranean Countries- Flows
Values in million USD In percentage of the flows in LDC
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Source UNCTAD DAC DAC US EUROST OECD UNCTA
D
DAC DAC US EUROST OECD
1980
1985 1.650
1990 2.051 -301 707 5,9 -2,2 3,1
1991 1.836 196 717 4,4 1,7 3,1
1992 3.074 707 758 1.154 6,2 3,5 5,0 4,5
1993 2.840 1.430 5.502 475 740 845 3,6 3,7 19,6 1,7 4,9 3,6
1994 3.728 1.387 1.434 533 1.093 894 3,7 2,9 3,9 1,7 4,3 2,3
1995 3.798 1.205 1.239 536 1.013 818 3,6 2,3 3,6 2,3 3,8 3,3
1996 4.539 1.290 6.440 948 1.168 1.355 3,4 2,2 9,1 3,2 3,1 2,9
1997 6.093 1.796 7.114 1.241 893 1.138 3,5 2,3 14,4 2,9 2,0 2,2
1998 6.013 3,6
Source:  IMF, UNCTAD, EUROSTAT, OECD
Note: 11 countries participating at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanese,
Syria, Malta, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey.
Figure 1 - MED as percentage on LDC (inflows and stocks)
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4Table 2 - FDI in Southern Mediterranean Countries- Stocks
Values in million USD In percentage of the flows in LDC
IDE Stocks US Stocks EU-15 Stocks IDE Stocks US Stocks EU-15 Stocks
Source UNCTAD US OECD UNCTAD US OECD
1980 6.171 4,6
1985 12.375 5,2
1990 21.401 2.641 2.471 5,8 2,5 2,3
1991 22.845 2.784 3.052 6,2 2,4 2,6
1992 26.155 3.607 4.408 6,2 2,6 3,6
1993 28.848 4.738 6.216 5,8 3,0 4,9
1994 33.318 4.290 6.808 5,6 2,4 4,5
1995 36.392 4.892 7.589 4,7 2,4 4,0
1996 40.931 5.748 7.976 5,3 2,4 3,6
1997 47.024 6.859 8.068 4,5 2,4 3,2
1998 53.038 4,3
Source: UNCTAD, OECD
Note: 11 countries participating at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanese, Syria, Malta, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey.
In order to improve the comprehension of this phenomenon, it would be
necessary to analyse more in detail FDI flows and determinants at country, both home
and host ones, and sector level. However, an accurate analysis of the external growth of
the transnational enterprises is prevented by the deficiencies of statistical data, often
inadequate, heterogeneous and partial. The utilisation of data drawn from the monetary
flows of the balance of payment statistics, tends to stress the cyclical reversals and, in
the opinion of the authors, to underestimate the real contribution of the investment
initiatives carried on by the transnational enterprises.
In quantitative terms, large asymmetries are found between home and host
reporting countries, due to the modalities of imputation of profits; in several cases
profits are reinvested in the foreign subsidiary (without a corresponding capital
movement, but with an effective participation of the transnational enterprise in the
host country); alternatively, the foreign partner supplies investment goods and licences
which are reported in kind or credits without affecting the ownership structure.
These strategic decisions, as well as inadequate reporting, are the sources of
quantitative asymmetries that prevent the correct interpretation and understanding of
the role of foreign enterprises. A reconciliation with the economic analysis should
therefore be encouraged. As an example, large asymmetries are found in the time series
prepared by investing countries, mainly from OECD and EUROSTAT, and those
prepared by the host countries, utilised by UNCTAD in his yearly report. The total
inflows in the Mediterranean countries should mirror the outflows from the industrial
countries reported by OECD and EUROSTAT, as far as the EU is concerned2. But
this is not the case, since inflows reported in UNCTAD statistics exceed always the
outflows declared by OECD countries. The differences are relevant, as shown in the
table 1 and 2.
                                                
2 For example, the situation found in the FDI inflows of Israel, in 1997 the UNCTAD report clearly
underlines a FDI inflow of 3.4 billions USD and goes further in commenting positively the 30 per cent
5An improvement in the quality of FDI statistics is recommendable, in order to
differentiate the cyclical dynamics of the 1990s. The reduction of FDI outflows from
the American enterprises seems more sensitive in the first half of the nineties, while the
financial contribution of the European enterprises has shown an increasing trend in the
final part of the decade. Are these changes linked to the Partenariat initiatives? The
recent developments that mark a positive change of direction, have not avoided the
marginalisation of the region in the decisions of the American and European enterprises.
For the European the reduction of the share is below 3%, from 5% in 1990. This U
shaped trend is clearly visible also in portfolio investment flows, that for their nature
are much more erratic and sensitive to the profitability conditions.
Although data on inward stocks of FDI are not available for all countries, their
analysis offers a further contribution to the understanding of FDI patterns in the MED
region. According to UNCTAD (1999) figures, the stock of foreign investments in the
Southern Mediterranean region exceeded 53 billions USD in 1998 but the share of the
region in the total inward FDI stock in developing countries contracted less than 4,5
percent, compared to 6,2 percent in 1990 or to 5.2 percent in 1985 (se Figure 1). Egypt
still remains the country with the most important stock of FDI, more than 15 billions
USD in 1997, followed by Israel (11.8 billions) and Turkey (6.4 billions). On the
contrary the position of Algeria has been now surpassed by Tunisia (with 3.4 billions
USD) and by Morocco .
3. FDI in the Mediterranean region: motivations and patterns
The strategic behaviour of TNCs investing into the area has changed over time, as
well as motivations. In the previous two decades foreign investments aimed at
overcoming custom protectionism. The set up of a production plant within the local
market strengthened the margins of competitiveness towards foreign exporters, or
reinforced the special links with local partners through subcontracting or joint-
venturing. Significant examples of this kind of investment strategy are the contracts of
exploration and oil extraction with SONATRAC in Algeria and a number of foreign
participation registered in Egypt or Turkey in the production and assembling of several
consumer goods for the domestic markets. These obstacles have not been still
eliminated and the degree of effective protection of the region is higher than that of
other developing countries or transition economies of Central Europe.
                                                                                                                                            
increase to the previous year. But this value is adding together FDI and portfolio investments and so
one can explain the asymmetry with similar data provided  by OECD, which applies rigorously the IMF
definition (foreign control at least 10 percent of the property). The same Bank of Israel, in its annual
report, specifies that “Nonresidents' investment flows in 1997 amounted to $ 3.7 billion, a rise of more
than 30 percent from the 1996 level; 45 percent was direct investment, and the rest was portfolio
investment in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) and in Israeli shares traded abroad”  (Annual Report
1997, page 150).
6The privatisation process and the reduction of the state intervention in the
economy are also contributing to modify the strategic behaviour of foreign enterprises
in many countries, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. In the Mediterranean
region, however, the privatisation process has been delayed too much and has been too
slow, worsening the competitiveness of local enterprises relative to those located in
other more dynamic regions, such as Central Europe, to mention the nearest one,
(Hoekman and Djankov, 1996), or Latin America.
Ultimately, the overall production system of the region still remains prudent or
dubious on the benefits of the changing relationships with Europe, since the first
Association agreements were signed in 1994 (before the conference of Barcelona) with
Tunisia and Morocco, followed three years later by Jordan, Palestinian territories and
recently by Egypt. Only in the former three countries we have noticed an increase of
FDI inflows, but given their size, the effects are limited and locally defined. Much more
important seems to be the agreement with Egypt, signed in 1999. It is expected that it
will generate more radical changes in the European direct investment patterns, even
though they are not yet visible in the statistical data.
Considering the distribution of FDI within the region, only six countries turn out
to be dominant source of FDI, four of which are European. The evolution of the main
investor countries is presented in table 3. In 1997, 50.5 percent of total capital (15.9
billions USD) was controlled by European enterprises and only 6 percent by Japanese
enterprises. However, American TNCs remain the main investor in the region after the
stagnation during the mid Nineties. Compared with the dynamism of the American
investors, one can find evidence of the negative pattern of the European enterprises,
which did not react to the opportunities offered by the new political and economic
agreements with the EU. Within Europe, the most active enterprises are those from
Netherlands, France and to a lesser extent, from Germany. The Italian position, instead,
is slightly contracting, after an intense phase of investments in the energy sector and in
the distribution of gas. The relative stagnation of the European investments is due to
the effects of the European industrial restructuring, revitalised by the completion of the
single market, that has stimulated a significant investment activity within Europe. This
“Eurocentric” phase resulted in a general slowdown of capital outflows to developing
countries and to the Mediterranean region (Table 1, EUROSTAT source).
Nevertheless, a significant qualitative change is noticeable in the European investments,
with a greater proportion of FDI in the CEECs region.
7Table 3 - Distribution of FDI in the Southern Mediterranean Countries - Stocks
Values in million USD Distribution percentage
1990 1992 1995 1997 1990 1992 1995 1997
EU-15 2.471 4.408 7.589 8.068 46,3 53,0 55,9 50,5
Germany 582 1.577 1.786 1.697 10,9 19,0 13,2 10,6
France 483 1.041 1.680 1.678 9,1 12,5 12,4 10,5
Italy 714 761 1.067 1.125 13,4 9,1 7,9 7,0
Netherlands 148 245 1.702 1651 2,8 2,9 12,5 10,3
United States 2.641 3.607 4.892 6.859 49,5 43,4 36,0 43,0
Japan 224 307 1.124 1.028 4,2 3,7 8,3 6,4
Total OECD 5.335 8.319 13.581 15.961 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source:  Elaborations of the author on OECD data
Note: 11 countries participating at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanese,
Syria, Malta, Cyprus, Israel, Turkey.
Figure 2 - FDI in MED and CEEC (flows; million 
USD)
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Finally, considering a third statistical source we are able to cross home and host
countries and evaluate bilateral flows, at least for some countries. According to
UNCTAD (1996)3, European investors continue to maintain substantial interests in
Tunisia, Morocco, Syria and Lebanon, with several national shares greater than 70
percent (Tables 4 and 5). The United States have a dominant position in the energy
sector in Algeria and in the manufacturing sector in Israel, with a share less than 50
percent in both countries. The Arab investors play an important role in the banking and
real estate sector, often not adequately reported in official statistics. Generally, Arab
investments are spread off  over the whole region, except Israel. Moreover, the
presence of a North African and Lebanese diaspora contributes to determine further
uncertainties on the consistency of the capital stocks and inflows in the region.
According to a World Bank (1996)4 the capital accumulated abroad is four times more
than the average of the other developing countries and for the Mashreq it exceeds 46
percent of GDP.
                                                
3 UNCTAD (1996), World Investment Directory, West Asia, Volume VI, 1996.
4 World Bank (1996), Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, Washington, D.C.
8Table 4 - Distribution of FDI in the Southern Mediterranean Countries - Flows - Values percentages
Morocco Tunisia Israel Turkey
1992 1995 1989 1992 1994 1990 1996
EU 57,6 59,7 57,1 80,5 21,3 67,7 84,7
Germany 1,9 2,5 7,0 0,3 1,4 7,8 5,9
France 23,5 24,8 19,2 9,0 0,9 36,0 61,8
Italy 2,0 1,4 9,9 61,9 2,6 3,5 1,1
Spain 18,8 6,6 7,7 0,1 0,5
Netherlands 4,4 8,7 0,0 0,0 8,0 1,8 8,8
United Kingdom 2,0 8,5 0,0 0,0 5,4 15,4 4,3
Sweden 0,0 1,4 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
USA 6,8 11,6 17,0 11,7 52,8 6,9 4,7
Japan 0,1 2,5 0,1 0,0 0,0 5,5 0,5
Arab Countries 11,7 13,0
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source:  UNCTAD (1996) and original sources updated by the author.
Israel:  Ministry of Trade and Investment.  Tunisia:  Ministry of International Cooperation and Foreign
Investment, Tunisia Investment Promotion Agency.  Algeria:Agence de Promotion, de Soutien ae the Suivi des
Investissements.Marocco:  Ministére des Finances ET des Investissements Extérieurs.  Egypt:  Egyptian General
Authorioty for Investment.  Turkey:  Undersecretariat of the Treasury.
Table 5 - Distribution of FDI in the Southern Mediterranean countries - Stocks - Values percentages
Egypt Syria Lebanon Tunisia Algeria
1995 1993 1993 1994 1995
EU 40,4 81,9 99,5 70,0 23,2
Germany 4,5 36,4 -7,0 3,9
France 6,0 44,6 111,9 23,4 5,3
Italy 5,8 30,9 13,4
Spain 0,4 4,5
Netherlands 2,8 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0
United Kingdom 8,7 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0
Sweden 5,2
USA 16,7 0,6 53,0
Japan 4,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: UNCTAD (1996)
The sectoral distribution of FDI is concentrated in a limited number of sectors:
energy and mining in Algeria, Syria and Egypt; basic manufacturing, tourism and
infrastructures (Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan), labour intensive sectors (Tunisia, Morocco,
Turkey) and electronics and other high tech sectors but only in Israel. Generally,
Southern Mediterranean countries, tend to attract investments in activities scale and
capital intensive, that contributes to expand the production but that involves a modest
technological transfer (Petri, 1997). These factors affect the specialisation of the region
                                                                                                                                            
9and its differentiation with other LDC regions. Petri (1997) derives this conclusion on
anecdotal literature (with few quantitative support) and estimates that only one third
of the investment projects really improves the technological abilities of the region.
This implies that opportunities to generate new foreign investments remain tied to
natural resource endowments. This peculiar specialisation hinders the impact of FDI on
technological and organisational knowledge, a cause explaining the slow regional
development compared with the positive experience of the South East Asia and Latin
America.
4. The factors of attractiveness in the Mediterranean region: a preliminary
survey of the literature
Which are the causes of the insufficient attractiveness of the Mediterranean
countries? A first answer should be related to the motivations of the transnational
enterprises. The economic literature agrees on two precise motivations corresponding
to two different strategies of internationalisation of enterprises. Markusen (1995) and
Michalet (1996, 1997) distinguish two investment strategies, defined respectively as
“horizontal” and “vertical”. The horizontal strategy characterises foreign investments
which aim to secure an advantage when the host country opens up its domestic market.
Therefore, FDI can be considered as an extension of the export strategy, and it can be
also defined as “market seeking” since its target is local markets (Dunning, 1992). The
distinction is however arbitrary and deceptive since a horizontal FDI can be the
consequence not only of the opening up of the domestic market of the host country,
but also of its excessive protection that forces foreign investors to produce locally and
jump the tariffs and other barriers to trade. Products supplied in host markets, the
technology incorporated into the plants and the marketing strategies are generally
similar to those used in the home country. This presupposes the similarity of the
environmental conditions and the structural characteristics of the two countries.
On the contrary, the vertical strategy implies a new production system which
specialises in one particular phase of the production process and foreign enterprises
aim at lowering the production costs. This strategy can be identified with "efficiency
seeking" FDI. The choice of the host country is then explained by the factor
endowment. Vertical-type FDI is intersectorial and is supported by the price
differential of factors of production, while Horizontal-type FDI supports intra-sector
trade flows and generates differentiated products on the regional markets.
Michalet (1997) emphasises that horizontal FDI is more frequent in Morocco,
Tunisia, Turkey and Egypt. Therefore, the size and growth of the market are the main
determinants of investment decisions. However, the target market not necessarily
corresponds to the domestic one. It often includes other markets within the region.
This implies that foreign investors consider the host country as a bridge to enter
regional market through a “hub and spokes” pattern. This fact questions the above
mentioned traditional dichotomy of FDI strategies: horizontal and vertical FDI can not
be considered as two clearly differentiated strategies since they often overlap. The host
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country must guarantee not only the access to a market, both domestic and regional,
with a sufficient dimension, but also the presence of cheaper  factors of production in
order to make convenient the local production and the exporting activity into the region
or the rest of the world. The selectivity and the competition among multinational
enterprises seem therefore to reduce the  possibilities of locating into a limited number
of countries, as it happened for the CEEC and it is going to take place also for the
Mediterranean region. In the group of countries inquired by Michalet, foreign investors
seem to prefer Turkey, Hungary and the Poland, that are included in the group of the
Core countries. The author concluded that other Mediterranean countries have a
potential vocation for FDI, not completely exploited. The author endorses the
hypothesis of a complementary relation between Mediterranean and CEE countries
because of the different motivations declared by the transnational enterprises investing
into the two areas: they see opportunities for horizontal investments in Morocco,
Tunisia and Egypt, and for vertical investments in CEE.
Asked on the factors that influence the location and the choice of the host
country, transnational enterprises place at the first places the economic and political
stability followed by the dimension of the market. The political and economic
stability has a dimension that should inspire the legal and institutional framework: it
must be stable, transparent and reliable. These conditions are important and their
absence induces the enterprises to suspend their investment decisions or limits their
financial commitments. Therefore, Michalet’s survey confirms the traditional
hypothesis of TNCs risk averted. The availability of skilled labour, rather than low
labour costs, is the third variable that affect investors’ attractiveness and it should be
connected to the type of investment, the introduction of more complex technologies, as
well as the  tendency to externalise an increasing number of production phases.
Mediterranean countries’ poor structural conditions reinforce the risk of
marginalisation of the area, if the adoption of corrective measures aimed at modernising
the domestic production and labour market continues to be postponed. Such a risk is
real also in those countries that succeed in attracting foreign investors in the sixties and
the seventies. It seems that the current competitive model driven by the globalisation
contrasts with the old logic of tariff protectionism. Of growing importance is also the
need for communications and infrastructure that allow the transfer of information and
goods. Financial incentives rank last in the list of the factors of attractiveness quoted
by MNEs, with the exception of manufacturing and assembling activities, such as OPT
in the textile-apparel sector.
5. The econometric model
In this section we explore and analyse what factors best explain foreign direct
investments into CEE and the MED region. From a theoretical point of view, FDI
arises from a combination of industrial organisation motives that result in a number of
activities being placed under common ownership and control, and comparative
advantage reasons that cause these activities to be located in different countries and
11
regions (Krugman, 1995). Whilst there are no reasons to expect that factors determining
FDI in Central and Eastern Europe are different from those promoting FDI in the
Mediterranean countries, much less is know about the relative strength of these factors
in the two regions. In fact, there is little econometric evidence about the factors
determining inward investments in both regions5. However, quantitative analysis of the
factors determining flows of FDI is useful to establish whether and what government
policies can influence FDI. This section is devoted to shed light onto this issues by
assessing and comparing factors affecting the pattern of FDI in the two regions in a
framework of a standard location choice model.
In doing this, we utilise European Union and American outward stocks of FDI
for the years 1990-1997 in a panel data study of its determinants in eight Central
European countries – i.e. the Visegrad ones, Bulgaria,  Estonia, Romania and Slovenia –
and 11 Mediterranean countries – i.e. Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon,
Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. This framework allows us to include
exogenous fixed effects for each host countries, since both regions hide large differences
within them. It also allows for some variation in the behaviour of the investors,
depending on their country of origin, i.e. European Union or United States. Although
this panel is constrained in one dimension by the absence of the sectoral distribution of
FDI, it remains a rich source of information because of the considerable cross-sectional
differences between the countries included in it.
5.1 The independent  variables
An important aspect of any econometric analysis is the specification of the
model. The choice of the variables has been dictated by the literature on the
determinants of FDI in the developing countries, as summarised by Caves (1996) and
Singh and Jun (1996). Unfortunately, it has sometimes been constrained by the
availability of data. The independent variables have been chosen to reflect the
attractiveness of the host economies as potential locations for foreign investors.
According to the market size hypothesis, FDI in any period is assumed to be a
function of the size of the target market: the larger the market, the more opportunities
it offers to foreign investors. However, given the long-run nature of FDI, expected
market growth may be a more accurate factor in determining the distribution of FDI
among regions and countries. Since it is difficult to measure investors’ expectations, we
control for market potential by considering the inward stocks of FDI relative to
                                                
5 A small number of econometric studies on the determinants of FDI have recently been undertaken in
Central and Eastern Europe (Lansbury et al. 1996; Holland and Pain, 1998; Resmini 1999 and
Altomonte, 2000). As far as the MED region is concerned, Petri (1997) estimated a regression model to
determine how the level of FDI and stock market capitalization compare with international norms. He
found that there is great potential for expanding FDI into the region and that large gaps actually exist
between the Med countries and similar economies elsewhere. Michelet (1999) reporting the results of a
survey, concluded that the MED countries are actually excluded by the “core countries”, i.e. by that
group of countries whose characteristics are able to attract foreign investments regardless the country of
origin and the economic activities. Whilst such empirical evidence is informative, it does not provide a
full explanation of  recent patterns of investments in the MED region.
12
population. Moreover, we introduce as explanatory variable the growth rate of the
GDP, a variable that has been used in several studies (Wang and Swain, 1995; Holland
and Pain, 1998; Singh and Jun, 1996).
A number of studies have suggested that investments in developing countries
are also positively affected by the degree of openness of the host economy. This
implies that foreign investors prefer countries with relatively liberal trade regimes,
possibly within region with free trade agreements (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997).
Existing business linkages and knowledge of local markets may help foreign firms,
especially small and medium-sized ones, to take advantages of the opportunities
presented by a rapidly evolving market structure. In order to investigate whether the
stock of investments by individual countries in Central Europe and in the MED region
has been influenced by trade linkages, we use a measure defined as the share of trade
(exports plus imports) in each of the host economies accounted for by trade with the
investing economies. In addition, we include a measure of the growth rate of the GDP
of the trading partners of each host economy, weighted by trade shares, to test whether
investment decisions are influenced by trade arrangements that allows the entrance in
neighbouring markets.
Profit-maximising multinationals may decide to de-localise production plants
overseas to exploit  manufacturing cost advantages, in terms of both labour costs or
proximity to natural resources. The neo-classical theory of the determinants of FDI
suggests that host countries' labour supply influences foreign investors' location
decisions through the labour cost and the quality of the skills of the labour force.
Locations with low labour costs and/or highly skilled labour force are expected to be
more attractive for foreign investors, particularly for firms producing labour intensive
goods. Unfortunately, time-series data about labour costs and productivity are not
readily available in most of the countries included in the sample. Therefore, we try to
draw the importance of labour cost as an explanatory variable for FDI inward stocks
indirectly through the level of education. The proximity to natural resource hypothesis
is tested through the country specific fixed effects.
There is a general belief that a conducive business environment is necessary for
attracting FDI. The long-term nature of FDI makes it very sensitive to risk with
respect to portfolio investments. It may take several years before a foreign investment
becomes profitable, so investors want to be assured of the economic and political
stability of the host countries, globally considered. We proxy the business environment
characteristics with an index, the Operation Risk Index (ORI), computed by a
consultancy agency (Bery S.A). A panel of 105 experts from around the world
evaluates each country on the basis of a wide range of factors, including political
continuity, attitude toward foreign investors, enforceability of contracts, infrastructure
and local management. This qualitative index ranges from 0 (prohibitive risk) to 100
(operation conditions very closed to those existing in the industrialised countries). A
number of studies have already used this index as a proxy of country risk in a inter-
country perspective, with good results (Singh and Jun, 1996; Resmini, 1999 and
Altomonte, 2000).
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Finally, industrial location theory (Markusen and Venables, 1999), both at
regional and international level, suggests that the main force driving location decisions is
the strength of existing manufacturing activities. Manufacturers gain from locating in
closer proximity because of external economies; moreover, a country with a strong
concentration of manufacturing activities is more likely to have an adequate labour pool
and supply network to support industrial activity. Manufacturing development has
been measured by the share of manufacturing in total GDP.
To summarise, the estimated model assumes the following form:
ijtjtjtijtjtjtjtij
jt
ijt uGTPMANTRADEORIEDUG
POP
FDI
+++++++= 6543210)( ααααααα
where:
1997,...,1990
Tunisia Turkey, Syria, R.,Slovak  Slovenia, Romania, Poland,       
 Morocco, Malta, Israel, Hungary, Estonia, Egypt, R.,Czech  Cyprus, Bulgaria, Algeria,
,
=
=
=
t
j
USAEUi
FDI ijt denotes outward stock of FDI from country i to country j at time t, POPjt is the
population level of the host country, Gjt denotes the GDP growth rate of the host
country j, ORIjt measures the country risk, EDUjt is the level of tertiary education
(percentages), TRADEijt captures the intensity of trade linkages between home and
host countries, MANjt is the share of the industry in the GDP and GTPjt is the growth
rate of the trade partners of the host economies6. All variables are in log form. In
estimation we allow for country specific effects within host countries, j0α , since both
regions hide large differences within them. We also control for home country specific
effects ( i0α ). Not wishing to suppress useful information about some form of
interdependence among countries, a seemingly unrelated regression model has been
chosen (Matyas, Sevestre, 1996).
5.2 Expected sign of the explanatory variables
The first question to address is whether the expected signs of the explanatory
variables conform with the theoretical prediction of the determinants of FDI.
On a priori grounds, it is expected that FDI reacts positively to the market size
hypothesis. Therefore, we would expect that the relationship between FDI per capita
and the percentage growth of GDP is  positive. Moreover, if multinationals located
production facilities in Central Europe or in some of the MED countries to take
advantages of growing regional markets, also the sign of the coefficient of GTP will be
positive.
                                                
6 See data appendix for details on sources and definitions.
14
The coefficient of EDU may be positive or negative. It is expected to be
negative if foreign investors prefer less educated, and thus cheaper, workers. A positive
sign, instead, would indicate a preference for more productive, and thus more expensive
labour force.
The sign of the coefficient of the country risk is expected to be positive since
economically and politically stable countries offer more guarantees to foreign investors.
A well developed manufacturing sector sounds attractive for foreign firms since
the exploitation of agglomeration economies may increase efficiency and, then, profits.
Nevertheless, MAN could also have a negative sign since an increase in the size of the
manufacturing sector might also be a sign of a tougher competition. Foreign investments
driven by the search of strategic assets may be negatively affected by an increase in the
size of the manufacturing sector, since it becomes more and more difficult to gain
market share while pre-empting competitors from doing likewise. Moreover, in
transition countries this variable must be interpreted with further caution. Privatisation
and industry restructuring process may negatively affect the size of the manufacturing
sector. If foreign firms are attracted by restructured sectors, the sign of the coefficient
of MAN will be negative.
Finally, there are no prior assumptions regarding the sign of the coefficient of
TRADE. Barriers to trade increase the costs associated with serving a foreign market
through exports, stimulating direct investments as a substitute for trade. In this case we
would expect a negative relation between TRADE and FDI. On the other hand, trade
and FDI may be complement, as multinationals tend to generate a high level of trade
between parent and affiliate firms. If this influence dominates, it is likely that the sign
of the coefficient of TRADE is positive. If the two forces balance, the coefficient will
tend to be close to zero.
5.3 Results
Tables from 6 to 9 show the results of the econometric analysis. We first
estimated the determinants of FDI by pooling all observations in a single sample (table
6). This analysis allows us to detect two important sources of heterogeneity in the
determinants of FDI: region specific effects, picked up by the REG dummy, and home
country specific effects, caught by the HOME dummy. Both are statistically
significant at the one per cent level. We thus plunged into these specific effects. First of
all, we split the original sample into two sub-regional ones (CEECs and MED ones) in
order to detect potential structural changes in the determinants of FDI due to region
specific effects. Because of the presence of several missing values, panels are not
balanced and the number of countries included may vary according to the availability of
data. The resulting coefficients for the CEECs and the MED ones are reported in tables
7 and 8, respectively. Secondly,. we allow for separate slope coefficients among home
countries within each sub-region since heterogeneity can give rise to bias if slope
homogeneity is imposed. The results are reported in table 9.
Concerning CEECs, the fit of the equations seems good, with an adjusted R2
higher than 0.80. All equations include separate intercepts for each host countries and a
dummy variable to control for home country effects. Both are statistically significant.
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The first column (model 1) reports the parameter estimates obtained for the
basic model including all the explanatory variables. Only one variable, that is, the
growth rate of the host economies, is statistically insignificant with a coefficient very
closed to zero, suggesting that market size effects are adequately captured by
conditioning on the population level. The growth rate of the trading partners has a
negative coefficient  close to zero. This result, can be explained partly by the fact that
FDI have been targeted mainly to the domestic markets and not to the regional ones,
and partly by the “Eurocentric” phase of the European foreign investments discussed
in section 37.
The coefficient of EDU is positive, indicating that foreign firms prefer locations
with highly skilled labour force, even though this implies higher wages. This does not
mean that low labour costs do not play a role as determinants of FDI, since CEE is
generally considered as low cost area with respect to Western Europe and the United
States as well. Rather, this result confirms that the productivity gap between home and
host countries is not very  pronounced (Lankes and Venables, 1996). Also the
coefficient of TRADE is positive and greater than one, indicating that bilateral trade
relations are important to stimulate FDI. The negative sign shown by MAN is not
surprisingly since in transition countries privatisation and restructuring processes have
played an important role as determinants of FDI8. ORI coefficient is very high,
suggesting that foreign firms investing in Central and Eastern Europe are very
concerned about risk.
In column 2 we dropped the insignificant growth rate variable. There is little
change in the coefficients on most of the remaining variables. Finally in column 3, we
estimated the original model without the degree of development of the manufacturing
sector variable (MAN). The exclusion of this variable causes the size and the
significance of the coefficient on risk country variable to increase markedly, suggesting
that the effects of the restructuring process may have also been picked up by the
country risk measure. Moreover, we observe  the growth rate variable becomes
significant, even though the coefficient remains very small.
The formulation of the model seems to be appropriate also for the Med region,
since it explains about two third of the variation in the dependent variable (table 8).
However, the signs of the coefficients do not always agree with the underlying
economic theory. Market size effects are correctly picked up by the specification of
the dependent variable, as in the CEE panel. However, regional markets are here more
important than in Central and Eastern Europe. The coefficient of GTP is small but
                                                
7 European investments into CEE accounts for about 80 per cent of total investments. At first sight, one
could  think that this wrong sign might be the result of some multicollinearity with other variables,
especially the home country dummy. This last, however, picks up only behavioral differences between
EU and United States, rather than structural differences. Multicollinearity with host country dummies,
instead, can not be excluded, since most of the countries included in the sample trade among them.
8 Again, multicollinearity with host country variables can not be excluded, since the size of the
manufacturing sector depends on the industrial structure of each host countries. In fact, MAN show a
positive sign in the restricted model (equal intercept across countries). However, restrictions can not be
accepted at the conventional level of significance. In order to minimize multicollinearity, we dropped
MAN in model 3.
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significant at the one per cent level of confidence. The sign of the country risk variable
is not coherent with the economic theory since ORI shows a negative but significant
sign. This would indicate that FDI per capita stock decreases as country risk decreases,
being other things equal. This surprising result may be explained partly by the fact that
most FDI in the MED region has always been resource specific and natural resource
seeker investors localise wherever resources are available, regardless of the presence of
other factors of attraction (Dunning, 1998). Partly, it might be due to the specification
of the country risk variable, not suitable to explain risks that foreign investors face in
the MED region. It has been argued that one of the major problem of many Med
countries is the legitimacy of the Governments. In several countries it seems to be a
lack of consensus and an absence of dialogue with dissenters. Recently, the situation
has not changed substantially. “The ensuing huge social problems interact with the
other factors to create an endemic instability which discourages foreign investors”
(ERF, 1999) since governability and the consequent capacity to gain consensus within
law is frequently perceived to be an indicator of long-run stability. ORI, by definition,
catches prevalently economic stability, being based on economic variables rather than
on political and social indicators.
Also the size of the manufacturing sector seems to affect negatively the stock of
FDI, as previously obtained in Central and Eastern Europe panel. According to recent
studies (Petri, 1997) the bulk of new FDI projects undertaken in the MED region
represent relatively large-scale, capital intensive undertakings in mining and quarrying,
industry and infrastructure and in particular petrochemical plants, cement factories and
power plants. All these sectors are characterised by a strong presence of large firms and
by a tough competition due to the need to exploit economies of scale to become
competitive. Thus, foreign investments in the MED region may hide strategic objective
(first mover advantages, natural resource control, etc.). Finally, EDU and TRADE are
statistically significant with the expected sign. However, TRADE coefficient is smaller
than that previously obtained in the CEE panel. Overall, coefficient signs do not change
across the specifications of the model. Host country intercepts are positive and the null
hypothesis of equal country intercepts can be rejected at the conventional level of
significance as in the case of the CEECs. Differently from the previous panel, country
intercepts are now catching up the importance of resource specific FDI. Home country
effects are always significant.
In order to test the existence of a different sensitivity of FDI coming from
different country of origin, to the explanatory variables, we re-estimated the basic
model relaxing the hypothesis of equal slope coefficients among investors. The results
are reported in table 9. The null hypothesis of equal slope coefficients can not be
rejected in CEE panel. In the Med region, however, FDI coming from Western Europe
reacts to the explanatory variables differently from American outward FDI stocks.
These differences concern two variables, i.e. country risk and the regional market
potential. While European investors seem to be risk neutral, since the coefficient is
closed to zero, though always negative, American FDI stock are more sensitive to the
risk country, even though in a surprising way: ceteris paribus, an increase in the degree
of economic stability reduces FDI stock per capita of about 6.6 per cent. This result
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implies that economic stability may compensate the lack of governability for most
European investors, while American investors prefer political to economic stability.
Finally, Western European FDI are less sensitive to regional market potential than
American investors.
6. Conclusions
This study was designed to identify the factors that would explain the patterns
and the determinants of FDI in the Mediterranean region during 1990-1997. The most
important fact characterising this period has been the extension of the Association
Agreements to most of the countries belonging to the region. It was thought that these
agreements would have given a new boost to foreign direct investments into the region,
penalised by the emerging of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as
preferential partners of the EU. We take into consideration this potential competition
by comparing the factors determining FDI in the MED region with those attracting FDI
in Central and Eastern Europe.
Attracting FDI has been one of the key policy goals of Central European
governments and today everybody agrees that FDI has been an important vehicle to
accelerate enterprise modernisation and restructuring by introducing new technologies,
management techniques and marketing practices. In other words, Central and Eastern
Europe experience demonstrates that it is important to understand what drives foreign
investors in order to exploit scarce resources most effectively.
According to our empirical analyses, natural resource endowment still
represents an important factor of attraction of FDI, relative to Central and Eastern
Europe. Moreover, foreign investors have been attracted in the MED region by market
considerations, concerning not only the single national markets, but also the regional
one. This effect is stronger than in Central and Eastern Europe, suggesting that a deeper
regional integration may sound attractive to foreign enterprises, mainly if the parent
firm is located in the United States. The availability of high skilled labour is another
important factor of attraction for foreign investors provided that wage differentials
between home and host countries prevail on productivity differentials. Trade with
major investors countries also matters, even though the derived effect appears
somewhat smaller than found in Central Europe. This implies that an improvement in
trade relationships with the EU – as envisaged by the Association Agreements – would
have a positive impact on FDI patterns. The impact of the development of the
manufacturing sector variable on FDI is less clear, because of the presence of
multicollinearity that weakens the econometric results. According to our analysis,
strategic motivations may boost foreign investors to prefer less developed sectors. This
may imply that the degree of development actually got by the manufacturing sector in
the MED region is not adequate to attract other firms, both domestic and foreign. A
further increase in the number of foreign firms could accelerate the formation of
agglomeration economies. Country risk deserves further considerations. A conducive
business environment is certainly important for foreign investors, as the experience of
Central and Eastern Europe demonstrates. This result is however coherent with
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previous analysis. In the MED region, this is not sufficient, since economic stability
must be accompanied by political stability in order to affect positively FDI inward
stocks not related to natural resource exploitations. This result implies that the MED
countries should concentrate their efforts on getting a higher level of “governability
attractiveness” (ERF, 1999) in order to attract a higher number of foreign investments.
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Data Appendix
FDI – stock data for 1990-1997 from OECD, International direct investment statistics
yearbook, various years.
POP – Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators, World Bank.
G – GDP growth (annual %), Global Development Finance & World Development
Indicators, World Bank.
GTP – GDP per capita growth of trading Partners  (weighted average by trade share),
IMF: Directions of Trade (trade data); Global Development Finance & World
Development Indicators (GDP per capita growth).
EDU – School enrollment, tertiary (% gross), Global Development Finance & World
Development Indicators.
TRADE – 
jj
ijij
XM
XM
+
+
, where Mij is the year value of imports from the ith investor
country to the jth home country; Xij is the year value of exports from the the ith
investor country to the jth home country, and Mj and Xj are the yearly total value
of imports and exports in the home country (IMF, Direction of trade statistics,
1999).
MAN – share of GDP created by the manufacturing sector; World Bank, World
development indicators for Mediterranean countries and OECD, Short Economic
Indicators, for Central and Eastern Europe countries.
ORI – Operation Risk Index, Bery S.A. weighted average of the following 15 criteria
(weighting in parenthesis): policy continuity (3), Attitude: foreign investors and
Profits (1.5), Degree of privatisation (1.5.), Monetary inflation (1.5), Balance of
Payments (1.5), Bureaucratic delays (1), Economic growth (2.5), Currency
convertibility (2.5), Enforceability of contracts (2.5), Labour cost, productivity
(2), Professional services and Contractors (0.5), Communications and
Transportation (1), Local management and partners (1), Short-term credits (2),
Long term loans and Venture capital (2). ORI ranges from 0 (unacceptable
business conditions) to 100 (stable environment typical of an advanced
industrialised economy).
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Table 6 Econometric results: all countries
variables model 1 model 2
C -21.71 (14.29)
G 0.11 (5.01) 0.09 (0.73)
GTP 0.09(1.15) 0.06 (0.97)
EDU 0.28 (1.23) 2.40 (17.43)
ORI 7.27 (20.70) 2.09 (4.85)
TRADE 1.44 (15.03) 1.30 (25.25)
MAN -0.48 (1.73) -4.68 (13.44)
HOME -2.49 (10.00) -2.07 (14.49)
REG 2.61 (15.91)
host country effects F(13,153)=20.10
R2 0.52 0.78
adj. R2 0.49 0.75
SE 1.41 1
n. of observations 174 174
?
?




=
?
?




=
MED     0
CEE     1
  ;
   USA 0
EU    1
REGHOME ; t-statistic in parenthesis.
Table 7: Econometric results: Central and Eastern European Countries
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3
G 0.004 (1.32) 0.006 (2.48)
GTP -0.37 (4.67) -0.37 (4.64) -0.4 (6.27)
EDU 2.56 (7.47) 2.90 (12.74) 2.80 (8.82)
ORI 4.34 (3.72) 4.35 (3.90) 7.80 (9.52)
TRADE 1.36 (3.85) 1.47 (4.83) 1.21 (4.71)
MAN -2.41 (3.68) -2.54 (4.31)
HOME -2.37 (2.38) -2.67 (3.14) -1.98 (2.74)
host country effects F(7, 71)=15.38 F(7, 71)=19.79 F(7,83)=14.10
R2 0.89 0.88 0.87
adj. R2 0.87 0.87 0.84
SE 0.77 0.78 0.84
n. of observations 86 86 90
t-statistics in parenthesis.
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Table 8 Econometric results: Mediterranean countries
Variables model 1 model 2 model 3
G -0.11 (1.10)
GTP 0.93 (3.60) 0.82 (3.70) 0.84 (3.07)
EDU 2.67 (3.56) 1.77 (3.78) 2.42 (7.20)
ORI -3.91 (3.10) -4.61 (5.84) -3.79 (6.37)
TRADE 0.94(4.70) 0.79 (5.25) 0.49 (4.35)
MAN -6.18 (3.26) -3.00 (2.72)
HOME -1.17 (3.09) -0.94 (2.95) -1.07 (4.63)
host country effects F(4,68)=18.18 F(5,76)=13.14 F(7,111)=6.88
R2 0.7 0.69 0.69
adj. R2 0.65 0.64 0.65
SE 0.99 1.02 1.08
n. of observations 80 88 114
t-statistics in parenthesis.
Table 9 Additional econometric results: home country effects
Variables CEE Med region
G 0.006 (2.15) -0.04 (0.80)
GTP -0.31 (3.16) 1.73 (5.91)
EDU 2.78 (6.65) 2.61 (3.88)
ORI 6.60 (6.38) -5.93 (7.15)
TRADE 1.21 (4.21) 0.54 (1.33)
MAN -4.99 (3.66)
HOME -7.94 (1.72) -16.96 (5.49)
G*HOME -0.001 (0.18) -0.13 (0.77)
GTP*HOME 0.07 (0.45) -1.4 (4.70)
EDU*HOME -0.19 (0.39) -0.36 (0.43)
ORI*HOME 1.72 (1.67) 5.70 (6.30)
TRADE*HOME -0.31 (0.76) -2.03 (1.32)
host country effects F(7,71)=9.10 F(4,62)=19.63
R2 0.87 0.79
adj. R2 0.83 0.73
SE 0.88 0.88
n. of observations 90 80
  
HOME =
1    EU
0    USA
. Consequently, USA coefficients are those of the explanatory
variables, while EU coefficients are those of the explanatory variables plus the differential
slope coefficients, i.e. those of the multiplicative dummies, provided that they are statistically
significant. (Gujarati, 1995). t-statistics in parenthesis.
